Self-play, where the algorithm learns by playing against itself without requiring any direct supervision, has become the new weapon in modern Reinforcement Learning (RL) for achieving superhuman performance in practice. However, the majority of exisiting theory in reinforcement learning only applies to the setting where the agent plays against a fixed environment. It remains largely open whether self-play algorithms can be provably effective, especially when it is necessary to manage the exploration/exploitation tradeoff.
Introduction
This paper studies competitive reinforcement learning (competitive RL), that is, reinforcement learning with two or more agents taking actions simultaneously, but each maximizing their own reward. Competitive RL is a major branch of the more general setting of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), with the specification that the agents have conflicting rewards (so that they essentially compete with each other) yet can be trained in a centralized fashion (i.e. each agent has access to the other agents' policies) (Crandall and Goodrich, 2005) .
There are substantial recent progresses in competitive RL, in particular in solving hard multi-player games such as GO (Silver et al., 2017) , Starcraft (Vinyals et al., 2019) , and Dota 2 (OpenAI, 2018) . A key highlight in their approaches is the successful use of self-play for achieving super-human performance in absence of human knowledge or expert opponents. These self-play algorithms are able to learn a good policy for all players from scratch through repeatedly playing the current policies against each other and performing policy updates using these self-played game trajectories. The empirical success of self-play has challenged the conventional wisdom that expert opponents are necessary for achieving good performance, and calls for a better theoretical understanding.
In this paper, we take initial steps towards understanding the effectiveness of self-play algorithms in competitive RL from a theoretical perspective. We focus on the special case of two-player zero-sum Markov General Markov Game VI-ULCB (Theorem 2)Õ ( √ H 3 S 2 ABT )Õ(H 4 S 2 AB/ǫ 2 ) PPAD-complete VI-explore (Theorem 5)Õ ((H 5 S 2 ABT 2 ) 1/3 )Õ(H 5 S 2 AB/ǫ 2 ) Polynomial Mirror Descent (H = 1) (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013 games (Shapley, 1953; Littman, 1994) , a generaliztion of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to the twoplayer setting. In a Markov game, the two players share states, play actions simultaneously, and observe the same reward. However, one player aims to maximize the return while the other aims to minimize it. This setting covers the majority of two-player games including GO (there is a single reward of {+1, −1} at the end of the game indicating which player has won), and also generalizes zero-sum matrix games (von Neumann, 1928) -an important game-theoretic problem-into the multi-step (RL) case. More concretely, the goal of this paper is to design low-regret algorithms for solving episodic two-player Markov games in the general setting (Kearns and Singh, 2002) , that is, the algorithm is allowed to play the game for a fixed amount of episodes using arbitrary policies, and its performance is measured in terms of the regret. We consider a strong notion of regret for two-player zero-sum games, where the performance of the deployed policies in each episode is measured against the best response for that policy, which can be different in differnet episodes. Such a regret bound measures the algorithm's ability in managing the exploration and exploitation tradeoff against fully adaptive opponents, and can directly translate to other types of guarantees such as the PAC sample complexity bound.
Our contribution This paper introduces the first line of provably sample-efficient self-play algorithms for zero-sum Markov game under no restrictive assumptions. Concretely,
Related Work
There is a fast-growing body of work on multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Many of them achieve striking empirical performance, or attack MARL in the cooperative setting, where agents are optimizing for a shared or similar reward. We refer the readers to several recent surveys for these results (see e.g. Buşoniu et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2018; OroojlooyJadid and Hajinezhad, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019) . In the rest of this section we focus on theoretical results related to competitive RL.
Markov games Markov games (or stochastic games) is proposed as a mathematical model for compeitive RL back in the early 1950s (Shapley, 1953) . There is a long line of classical work since then on solving this problem (see e.g. Littman, 1994 e.g. Littman, , 2001 Hu and Wellman, 2003; Hansen et al., 2013) . They design algorithms, possibly with runtime guarantees, to find optimal policies in Markov games when both the transition matrix and reward are known, or in the asymptotic setting where number of data goes to infinity. These results do not directly apply to the non-asymptotic setting where the transition and reward are unknown and only a limited amount of data are available for estimating them.
A few recent work tackles self-play algorithms for Markov games in the non-asymptotic setting, working under either structural assumptions about the game or stronger sampling oracles. Wei et al. (2017) propose an upper confidence algorithm for stochastic games and prove that a self-play style algorithm finds ǫ-optimal policies in poly(1/ǫ) samples. Jia et al. (2019) ; Sidford et al. (2019) study turn-based stochastic gamesa special case of general Markov games, and propose algorithms with near-optimal sample complexity. However, both lines of work make strong assumptions-on either the structure of Markov games or how we access data-that are not always true in practice. Specifically, Wei et al. (2017) assumes no matter what strategy one agent sticks to, the other agent can always reach all states by playing a certain policy, and Jia et al. (2019) ; Sidford et al. (2019) assume access to simulators (or generative models) which enable the agent to directly sample transition and reward information for any state-action pair. These assumptions greatly alleviate the challenge in exploration. In contrast, our results apply to general Markov games without further structural assumptions, and our algorithms have built-in mechanisms for solving the challenge in the exploration-exploitation tradeoff.
Finally, we note that classical R-MAX algorithm (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2002) does not make restrictive assumptions. It also has provable guarantees even when playing against the adversarial opponent in Markov game. However, the theoretical guarantee in Brafman and Tennenholtz (2002) is weaker than the standard regret, and does not directly imply any self-play algorithm with regret bound in our setting (See Section E for more details).
Adversarial MDP Another line of related work focuses on provable algorithms against adversarial opponents in MDP. Most work in this line considers the setting with adversarial rewards (see e.g. Zimin and Neu, 2013; Rosenberg and Mansour, 2019; Jin et al., 2019) . These results do not direcly imply provable self-play algorithms in our setting, because the adversarial opponent in Markov games can affect both the reward and the transition. There exist a few works that tackle both adversarial transition functions and adversarial rewards (Yu and Mannor, 2009; Cheung et al., 2019; Lykouris et al., 2019) . In particular, Lykouris et al. (2019) considers a stochastic problem with C episodes arbitrarily corrupted and obtain O(C √ T + C 2 ) regret. When applying these results to Markov games with an adversarial opponent, C can be Θ(T ) without further assumptions, which makes the bound vacuous.
Single-agent RL There is an extensive body of research on the sample efficiency of reinforcement learning in the single agent setting (see e.g. Jaksch et al., 2010; Osband et al., 2014; Azar et al., 2017; Dann et al., 2017; Strehl et al., 2006; Jin et al., 2018) , which are studied under the model of Markov decision processa special case of Markov games. For the tabular episodic setting with nonstationary dynamics and no simulators, the best regrets achieved by existing model-based and model-free algorithms areÕ( √ H 2 SAT ) (Azar et al., 2017) andÕ( √ H 3 SAT ) (Jin et al., 2018) , respectively, where S is the number of states, A is the number of actions, H is the length of each episode, and T is the total number of steps played. Both of them (nearly) match the minimax lower bound Ω( √ H 2 SAT ) (Jaksch et al., 2010; Osband and Van Roy, 2016; Jin et al., 2018) .
Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider zero-sum Markov Games (MG) (Shapley, 1953; Littman, 1994) , which also known as stochastic games in the literature. Zero-sum Markov games are generalization of standard Markov Decision Processes (MDP) into the two-player setting, in which the max-player seeks to maximize the total return and the min-player seeks to minimize the total return.
Formally, we consider tabular episodic zero-sum Markov games of the form MG(H, S, A, B, P, r), where
• H is the number of steps in each episode. [H] . We use the notation µ h (a|s) and ν h (b|s) to present the probability of taking action a or b for state s at step h under policy µ or ν respectively. We use V µ,ν h : S h → R to denote the value function at step h under policy µ and ν, so that V µ,ν h (s) gives the expected cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from s h = s, until the end of the episode:
We also define Q µ,ν h : S h × A h × B h → R to denote Q-value function at step h so that Q µ,ν h (s, a) gives the cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from s h = s, a h = a, b h = b, till the end of the episode:
For simplicity, we use notation of operator P h so that
where we define V µ,ν H+1 (s) = 0 for all s ∈ S H+1
Best response and regret We now define the notion of best response and review some basic properties of it (cf. (Filar and Vrieze, 2012) ), which will motivate our definition of the regret in two-player Markov games. For any max-player strategy µ, there exists a best response of the min-player, which is a policy
. By symmetry, we can define the best response of the max-player µ † (ν), and define V †,ν h . The value functions V µ, † h and V †,ν h satisfy the following Bellman optimality equations:
It is further known that there exist policies µ ⋆ , ν ⋆ that are optimal against the best responses of the opponent:
It is also known that, for any (s, h), the minimax theorem holds:
Therefore, the optimal strategies (µ ⋆ , ν ⋆ ) are also the Nash Equalibrium for the Markov game. Based on this, it is sensible to measure the suboptimality of any pair of policies (μ,ν) using the gap between their performance and the performance of the optimal strategy when playing against the best responses respectively, i.e.,
We make this formal in the following definition of the regret.
Definition 1 (Regret). For any algorithm that plays the Markov game for K episodes with (potentially adversarial) starting state s k 1 for each episode k = 1, 2, . . . , K, the regret is defined as
where (µ k , ν k ) denote the policies deployed by the algorithm in the k-th episode.
We note that as a unique feature of self-play algorithms, the learner is playing against herself, and thus chooses strategies for both max-player and min-player at each episode.
Turn-based games
In zero-sum Markov games, each step involves the two players playing simultaneously and independently. It is a general framework, which constains a very important special case-turn-based games. (Shapley, 1953; Jia et al., 2019) .
The main feature of a turn-based game is that only one player is taking actions in each step; in other words, the max and min player take turns to play the game. Formally, a turn-based game can be defined through a partition of steps [H] into two sets H max and H min , where H max and H min denote the sets of steps the max-player and the min-player choose the actions respectively, whhich satisfies H max ∩ H min = ∅ and H max ∪ H min = [H]. As a special example, GO is a turn-based game in which the two players play in alternate turns, i.e.
H max = {1, 3, . . . , H − 1} and H min = {2, 4, . . . , H}
Mathematically, we can specialize general zero-sum Markov games to turn-based games by restricting A h = {å} for all h ∈ H min , and B h = {b} for all h ∈ H max , whereå andb are special dummy actions. Consequently, in those steps, A h or B h has only a single action as its element, i.e. the corresponding player can not affect the game in those steps. A consequence of this specialization is that the Nash Equilibria for turn-based games are pure strategies (i.e. deterministic policies) (Shapley, 1953) , similar as in one-player MDPs. This is not always true for general Markov games.
Main Results
In this section, we present our algorithm and main theorems. In particular, our algorithm is the first self-play algorithm that achievesÕ( √ T ) regret in Markov Games. We describe the algorithm in Section 3.1, and present its theoretical guarantee for general Markov games in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we show that when specialized to turn-based games, the regret and runtime of our algorithm can be further improved.
Algorithm description
To solve zero-sum Markov games, the main idea is to extend the celebrated UCB (Upper Confidence Bounds) principle-an algorithmic principle that achieves provably efficient exploration in bandits (Auer et al., 2002) and Regret bounds for UCBVI is then established by showing and utilizing the fact that Q up remains an optimistic (upper) estimate of the optimal Q ⋆ throughout execution of the algorithm.
In zero-sum games, the two player have conflicting goals: the max-player seeks to maximize the return and the min-player seeks to minimize the return. Therefore, it seems natural here to maintain two sets of Q estimates, one upper bounding the true value and one lower bounding the true value, so that each player can play optimistically with respect to her own goal. We summarize this idea into the following proposal.
Proposal (Naive two-player extension of UCBVI): Compute Q up h (s, a, b), Q low h (s, a, b) based on estimated transition and {upper, lower} estimates of rewards, then play one episode where the max-player (µ) is greedy with respect to Q up and the min-player (ν) is greedy with respect to Q low . However, the above proposal is not yet a well-defined algorithm: a greedy strategy µ with respect to Q up requires the knowledge of how the other player chooses b, and vice versa. Therefore, what we really want is not that "µ is greedy with respect to Q up ", but rather that "µ is greedy with respect to Q up when the other player uses ν", and vice versa. In other words, we rather desire that (µ, ν) are jointly greedy with respect to (Q up , Q low ).
Our algorithm concretizes such joint greediness precisely, building on insights from one-step matrix games: we choose (µ h , ν h ) to be the Nash equilibrium for the general-sum game in which the payoff matrix for the max player is Q up and for the min player is Q low . In other words, both player have their own payoff matrix (and they are not equal), but they jointly determine their policies. Formally, we let (µ, ν) be determined as
for all (h, s), where NASH GENERAL SUM is a subroutine that takes two matrices P, Q ∈ R A×B , and returns the Nash equilibrium (φ, ψ) ∈ ∆ A × ∆ B for general sum game, which satisfies
Such an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist due to the seminal work of Nash (1951) , and is computable by algorithms such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964) . With the NASH GENERAL SUM subroutine in hand, our algorithm can be briefly described as The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Guarantees for General Markov Games
We are now ready to present our main theorem.
Theorem 2 (Regret bound for VI-ULCB). For zero-sum Markov games, Algorithm 1 (with choice of bonus β t = c H 2 Sι/t for large absolute constant c) achieves regret
We defer the proof of Theorem 2 into Appendix A.1.
Algorithm 1 Value Iteration with Upper-Lower Confidence Bound (VI-ULCB)
12:
for s ∈ S h do 13:
16:
for step h = 1, . . . , H do 17:
18:
Observe reward r h and next state s h+1 .
19:
Optimism in the face of uncertainty and best response An implication of Theorem 2 is that a low regret can be achieved via self-play, i.e. the algorithm plays with itself and does not need an expert as its opponent. This is intriguing because the regret is measured in terms of the suboptimality against the worst-case opponent:
gap between µ k and the best response to ν k
gap between ν k and the best response to µ k .
(Note that this decomposition of the regret has a slightly different form from (5).) Therefore, Theorem 2 demonstrates that self-play can protect against fully adversarial opponent even when such a strong opponent is not explicitly available.
The key technical reason enabling such a guarantee is that our Q estimates are optimistic in the face of both the uncertainty of the game, as well as the best response from the opponent. More precisely, we show that the (Q up , Q low ) in Algorithm 1 satisfy with high probability
for all (s, a, b, h, k), where (Q up,k , Q low,k ) denote the running (Q up , Q low ) at the beginning of the k-th episode (Lemma 11). In constrast, such a guarantee (and consequently the regret bound) is not achiev-able if the upper and lower estimates are only guaranteed to {upper, lower} bound the values of the Nash equilibrium.
Translation to PAC bound Our regret bound directly implies a PAC sample complexity bound for learning near-equilibrium policies, based on an online-to-batch conversion. We state this in the following Corollary, and defer the proof to Appendix A.2.
Corollary 3 (PAC bound for VI-ULCB). Suppose the initial state of Markov game is fixed at s 1 , then there exists a pair of (randomized) policies ( µ, ν) derived through the VI-ULCB algorithm such that with probability at least 1 − p (over the randomness in the trajectories) we have
as soon as the number of episodes K ≥ Ω(H 4 S 2 ABι/ǫ 2 ), where ι = log(HSAB/(pǫ)), and the expectation is over the randomization in ( µ, ν).
Runtime of Algorithm 1 Algorithm 1 involves the NASH GENERAL SUM subroutine for computing the Nash equilibrium of a general sum matrix game. However, it is known that the computational complexity for approximating 2 such an equilibrium is PPAD-complete (Daskalakis, 2013) , a complexity class conjectured to not enjoy polynomial or quasi-polynomial time algorithms. Therefore, Algorithm 1 is strictly speaking not a polynomial time algorithm, despite of being rather sample-efficient. We note however that there exists practical implementations of the subroutine such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964) that can usually find the solution efficiently. We will further revisit the computational issue in Section 4, in which we design a computationally efficient algorithm for zero-sum games with a slightly worseÕ(T 2/3 ) regret.
Guarantees for Turn-based Markov Games
We now instantiate Theorem 2 on turn-based games (introduced in Section 2.1), in which the same algorithm enjoys better regret guarantee and polynomial runtime. Recall that in turn-based games, for all h, we have either A h = 1 or B h = 1, therefore given max
and thus by Theorem 2 the regret of Algorithm 1 on turn-based games is bounded by O( H 3 S 2 (A + B)T ).
Further, since either A h = 1 or B h = 1, all the NASH GENERAL SUM subroutines reduce to vector games rather than matrix games, and can be trivially implemented in polynomial (indeed linear) time. Indeed, suppose the payoff matrices in (6) has dimensions P, Q ∈ R A×1 , then NASH GENERAL SUM reduces to finding φ ∈ ∆ A and ψ ≡ 1 such that φ ⊤ P = max φφ ⊤ P (the other side is trivialized as ψ ∈ ∆ 1 has only one choice), which is solved at φ = e a ⋆ where a ⋆ = arg max a∈[A] P a . The situation is similar if P, Q ∈ R 1×B . We summarize the above results into the following corollary. s, a, b ).
6:
for s ∈ S do 7:
(μ h (·|s),ν h (·|s)) ← NASH ZERO SUM(Q h (s, ·, ·)) 8:
V h (s) = a,bμ h (a|s)ν h (b|s)Q h (s, a, b). 9: for all remaining episodes do 10:
Play the game with policy (μ,ν).
Computationally Efficient Algorithm
In this section, we show that the computational issue of Algorithm 1 is not intrinsic to the problem: there exists a sublinear regret algorithm for general zero-sum Markov games that has a guaranteed polynomial runtime, with regret scaling as O(T 2/3 ), slightly worse than that of Algorithm 1. Therefore, computational efficiency can be achieved if one is willing to trade some statistical efficiency (sample complexity). For simplicity, we assume in this section that the initial state s 1 is fixed.
Value Iteration after Exploration At a high level, our algorithm follows an explore-then-exploit approach. We begin by running a (polynomial time) reward-free exploration procedure REWARD FREE EXPLORATION(ǫ) on a small number of episodes, which queries the MDP and outputs an estimate (P,r). Then, we run value iteration on the empirial version of Markov game with transitionP and rewardr, which finds its Nash equilibrium (μ,ν). Finally, the algorithm simply plays the policy (μ,ν) for the remaining episodes. The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 2 in the Appendix.
By "reward-free" exploration, we mean the procedure will not use any reward information to guide exploration. Instead, the procedure prioritize on visiting all possible states and gathering sufficient information about their transition and rewards, so that (P,r) are close to (P, r) in the sense that the Nash equilibria of MG(P,r) and MG(P, r) are close, where MG(P,r) denotes the Markov game with transitionP and reward r.
This goal can be achieved by the following algorithm. For any fixed state s, we can create an artificial rewardr defined asr(s, a, b) = 1 andr(s ′ , a, b) = 0 for any s ′ = s, a and b. Then, we can treat C = A × B as a new action set for a single agent, and run any standard reinforcement learning algorithm with PAC or regret guarantees to find a near-optimal policyπ of MDP(H, S, C, P,r). It can be shown that the optimal policy for this MDP is the policy that maximize the probability to reach state s. Therefore, by repeatedly playingπ, we can gather transition and reward information at state s as well as we can. Finally, we repeat the routine above for all state s. See Appendix B for more details.
In this paper, we adapt the sharp treatments in Jin et al. (2020) which studies reward-free exploration in the single-agent MDP setting, and provide following guarantees for the REWARD FREE EXPLORATION procedure.
Theorem 5 (PAC bound for VI-Explore). With probability at least 1−p, REWARD FREE EXPLORATION(ǫ) runs for c(H 5 S 2 ABι/ǫ 2 + H 7 S 4 ABι 3 /ǫ) episodes with some large constant c, and ι = log(HSAB/(pǫ)), and outputs (P,r) such that the Nash equilibrium (μ,ν) of MG(P,r) satisfies
Importantly, such Nash equilibrium (μ,ν) of MG(P,r) can be computed by Value Iteration (VI) usinĝ P andr. VI only calls NASH ZERO SUM subroutine, which takes a matrix Q ∈ R A×B and returns the Nash equilibrium (φ, ψ) ∈ ∆ A × ∆ B for zero-sum game, which satisfies
This problem can by solved efficiently (in polynomial time) by many existing algorithms designed for convex-concave optimization (see, e.g. (Koller, 1994) ), and does not suffer from the PPAD-completeness that NASH GENERAL SUM does. The PAC bound in Theorem 5 can be easily converted into a regret bound, which is presented as follows.
Corollary 6 (Polynomial time algorithm via explore-then-exploit). For zero-sum Markov games, with probability at least 1 − p, Algorithm 2 runs in poly(S, A, B, H, T ) time, and achieves regret bound
where ι = log(SABT /p).
Towards the Optimal Regret
We investigate the tightness of our regret upper bounds in Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 through raising the question of optimal regret in two-player Markov games, and making initial progresses on it by providing lower bounds and new upper bounds in specific settings. Specifically, we ask an Open question: What is the optimal regret for general Markov games (in terms of dependence on (H, S, A, B))?
It is known that the (tight) regret lower bound for single-player MDPs is Ω( SAT · poly(H)) (Azar et al., 2017). By restricting two-player games to a single-player MDP (making the other player dummy), we immediately have Comparing this lower bound with the upper bound in Theorem 2 (Õ( S 2 ABT · poly(H)) regret for general games andÕ( S 2 (A + B)T · poly(H)) regret for turn-based games), there are gaps in both the S-dependence and the (A, B)-dependence.
Matching the lower bound on short-horizon games Towards closing the gap between lower and upper bounds, we develop alternative algorithms in the special case where each player only plays once, i.e. onestep general games with H = 1 and two-step turn-based games. In these cases, we show that there exists mirror descent type algorithms that achieve an improved regretÕ( S(A + B)T ) (and thus matching the lower bounds), provided that we consider a weaker notion of the regret defined as Definition 8 (Weak Regret). The weak regret for any algorithm that deploys policies (µ k , ν k ) in episode k is defined as
The difference in the weak regret is that it uses fixed opponents-as opposed to adaptive opponents-for measuring the performance gap: the max is taken with respect to a fixed µ for all episodes k = 1, . . . , K, rather than a different µ for each episode. By definition, we have for any algorithm that WeakRegret(K) ≤ Regret(K).
With the definition of the weak regret in hand, we now present our results for one-step games. Their proofs can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 9 (Weak regret for one-step simultaneous game, adapted from Rakhlin and Sridharan (2013) ). For one-step simultaneous games (H = 1), there exists a mirror descent type algorithm that achieves weak regret bound WeakRegret(T ) ≤Õ ( S(A + B) T ) with high probability.
Theorem 10 (Weak regret for two-step turn-based game). For one-step turn-based games (H = 2), there exists a mirror descent type algorithm that achieves weak regret bound WeakRegret(T ) ≤Õ( S(A + B)T ) with high probability.
Proof insights; bottleneck in multi-step case The improved regret bounds in Theorem 9 and 10 are possible due to availability of unbiased estimates of counterfactual Q values, which in turn can be used in mirror descent type algorithms with guarantees. Such unbiased estimates are only achievable in onestep games as the two policies are "not intertwined" in a certain sense. In contrast, in multi-step games (where each player plays more than once), such unbiased estimates of counterfactual Q values are no longer available, and it is unclear how to construct a mirror descent algorithm there. We believe it would be an important open question to close the gap in multi-step games (as well as the gap between regret and weak regret) for a further understanding of exploration in games.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the sample complexity of finding the equilibrium policy in the setting of competitive reinforcement learning, i.e. zero-sum Markov games with two players. We designed a self-play algorithm for zero-sum games and showed that it can efficiently find the Nash equilibrium policy in the exploration setting through establishing a regret bound. Our algorithm-Value Iteration with Upper and Lower Confidence Bounds-builds on a principled extension of UCB/optimism into the two-player case by constructing upper and lower bounds on the value functions and iteratively solving general sum subgames.
Towards investigating the optimal runtime and sample complexity in two-player games, we provided accompanying results showing that (1) the computational efficiency of our algorithm can be improved by explore-then-exploit type algorithms, which has a slightly worse regret; (2) the state and action space dependence in the regret can be reduced in the special case of one-step games via alternative mirror descent type algorithms.
We believe this paper opens up many interesting directions for future work. For example, can we design a computationally efficient algorithms that achievesÕ( √ T ) regret? What are the optimal dependence of the regret on (S, A, B) in multi-step games? Also, the present results only work in tabular games, and it would be of interest to investigate if similar results can hold in presence of function approximation. Choice of bonus: β t = c SH 2 ι/t for sufficient large absolute constant c.
Lemma 11 (ULCB). With probability at least 1 − p, we have following bounds for any (s, a, b, h, k):
Proof. By symmetry, we only need to prove the statement (9). For each fixed k, we prove this by induction from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at the (H + 1)-th step, V up,k H+1 (s) = sup µ V µ,ν k H+1 (s) = 0. Now, assume the left inequality in (9) holds for (h + 1)-th step, for the h-th step, we first recall the updates for Q functions respectively:
In case of Q up,k h (s, a, b) = H, the right inequality in (9) clearly holds. Otherwise, we have:
Since P k h perserves the positivity, by induction assumption, we know the first term is positive. By Lemma 12, we know the second term ≥ −β t . This finishes the proof of the right inequality in (9).
To prove the left inequality in (9), again recall the updates for V functions respectively:
where the first equation is by the definition of policy µ k the algorithm picks. Therefore:
This finishes the proof.
Lemma 12 (Uniform Concentration). Consider value function class
There exists an absolute constant c, with probability at least 1 − p, we have: Proof. We show this for one (s, a, b, k, h); the rest follows from a union bound over these indices (and results in a larger logarithmic factor.) Throughout this proof we let c > 0 to be an absolute constant that may vary from line to line. Let V ε be an ε-covering of V h+1 in the ∞ norm (that is, for any V ∈ V h+1 there exists V ∈ V ε such that sup s |V (s) − V (s)| ≤ ε.) We have |V ε | ≤ (1/ε) S , and by Hoeffding inequality and a union bound, we have with probability at least 1 − p that
.
Taking ε = c H 2 Sι/N k h (s, a, b), the above implies that
Meanwhile, with this choice of ε, for any V ∈ V h+1 , there exists V ∈ V ε such that sup s |V (s) − V (s)| ≤ ε, and therefore s, a, b) .
Combining the preceding two bounds, we have that the desired concentration holds for all V ∈ V h+1 .
Taking expectation with respect to this sampling gives
where we have applied Theorem 2 to bound the regret with high probability. Choosing K ≥Õ(H 4 S 2 AB/ǫ 2 ), the right hand side is upper bounded by ǫ, which finishes the proof.
B Proofs for Section 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 5 and Corollary 6 based on the following lemma about subroutine RE-WARD FREE EXPLORATION. We will defer the proof of this Lemma to Appendix D.
Lemma 13. Under the preconditions of Theorem 5, with probability at least 1 − p, for any policy µ, ν, we have:
whereV , V are the value functions of MG(P,r) and MG(P, r).
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Since both inf and sup are contractive maps, by Lemma 13, we have:
Since (μ,ν) are the Nash Equilibria for MG(P,r), we have inf νVμ ,ν 1 (s 1 ) = sup µV µ,ν 1 (s 1 ). This gives:
which finishes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Corollary 6
Recall that Theorem 5 requires T 0 = c(H 5 S 2 ABι/ǫ 2 + H 7 S 4 ABι 3 /ǫ) episodes to obtain an ǫ-optimal policies in the sense: sup
Therefore, if the agent plays the Markov game for T episodes, it can use first T 0 episodes to explore to find ǫ-optimal policies (μ,ν), and use the remaining T − T 0 episodes to exploit (always play (μ,ν)). Then, the total regret will be upper bounded by:
we finishes the proof.
C Proofs for Section 5 C.1 Proof of Theorem 9
The theorem is almost an immediate consequence of the general result on mirror descent (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013) . However, for completeness, we provide a self-contained proof here. The main ingredient in our proof is to show that a "natural" loss estimator satisfies desirable properties-such as unbiasedness and bounded variance-for the standard analysis of mirror descent type algorithms to go through.
Special case of S = 1 We first deal with the case of S = 1. As the game only has one step (H = 1), it reduces to a zero-sum matrix game with a noisy bandit feedback, i.e. there is an unknown payoff matrix R ∈ [0, 1] A×B , the algorithm playes policies
and the weak regret has form
Note that this regret can be decomposed as
We now describe the mirror descent algorithm for the max-player and show that it achieves bound I ≤ O( √ AT ) regardless of the strategy of the min-player. A similar argument on the min-player will yield a regret bound II ≤Õ( √ BT ) on the second part of the above regret and thus show WeakRegret(T ) ≤ O( (A + B)T ).
For all k ∈ [T ], define the loss vector ℓ k ∈ R A for the max-player as We now show that this loss estimate satisfies the following properties:
(1) Computable: the reward r(a, b k ) is seen when a = a k , and the loss estimate is equal to 1 for all a = a k .
(2) Bounded: we have ℓ k (a) ≤ 1 almost surely for all k and a.
(3) Unbiased estimate of ℓ k (a). For any fixed state a ∈ A, we have
(4) Bounded variance: one can check that
Letting y a := 1 − r(a, b k ), we have y a ∈ [0, 1] almost surely (though it is random), and thus
where a ⋆ = arg min a∈A y a .
Therefore, adapting the proof of standard regret-based bounds for the mirror descent (EXP3) algorithm (e.g. (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018, Theorem 11.1)), using the loss estimate ℓ k (a) and taking the stepsize to be η + ≡ log A/AT , we have the regret bound
where C > 0 is an absolute constant. This shows the desired boundÕ( √ AT ) for term I in the regret, and a similar boundÕ( √ BT ) holds for term II by using the same algorithm on the min-player.
Case of S > 1 The case of S > 1 can be viewed as S independent zero-sum matrix games. We can let both players play the each matrix game independently using an adaptive step-size sequence (such as the EXP3++ algorithm of Seldin and Slivkins (2014) ) so that on the game with initial state s ∈ S they achieve regret boundÕ
where T s denotes the number of games that has context s. 1 , a) ).
Compute Q k 2 (s k 2 , b) b∈B according to (13) and update
C.2 Proof of Theorem 10
We first describe our algorithm for one-step turn-based games (H = 2.) Note that this is not equivalent to a zero-sum matrix game, as there is an unknown transition dynamics involved. As both the max and min player only have one turn to play: µ = {µ 1 } and ν = {ν 2 }, in this section we will abuse notation slightly and use (µ, ν) to denote (µ 1 , ν 2 ). We will also use (A, B) to denote (A 1 , B 2 ) for similar reasons.
We now present our mirror descent based algorithm for one-step turn-based games. Define the loss estimates
The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
We are now in position to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 10
We begin by decomposing the weak regret into two parts:
In the following, we show that both WeakRegret + ≤ O( √ SAT ι) and WeakRegret − ≤ O( √ SBT ι), which when combined gives the desired result.
Letting p a := µ K (a|s 1 ) and y a := 2− r(s 1 , a)− r(s where a * = arg min a∈A y a .
Therefore, adapting the proof of standard regret-based bounds for the mirror descent (EXP3) algorithm (e.g. (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018, Theorem 11.1)), taking η + ≡ log A/AT , we have the regret bound
where C > 0 is an absolute constant.
In the general case where s k 1 are not fixed and can be (in the worst case) adversarial, the design of Algorithm 3 guarantees that for any s ∈ S, µ(·|s) gets updated after the k-th episode only if s k 1 = s; otherwise the µ(·|s) is left unchanged. Therefore, the algorithm behaves like solving S bandit problems independently, so we can sum up all the one-state regret bounds of the above form and obtain that
where T s := # k : s k 1 = s denotes the number of occurences of s among all the inital states, and (i) uses that s T s = T and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (or pigeonhole principle). Note that we does not know {T s } s∈S before the algorithm starts to play and thus cannot use η + (s) = log A/AT s . We instead use the EXP3++ algorithm (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014 ) whose step-size η +,k (s) = log A/AN k (s) is computable at each episode k.
Bounding WeakRegret − For any ν define r(s 2 , ν(s 2 )) := E b∼ν(·|s 2 ) [r(s 2 , b)] for convenience. We have
where (i) follows from the fact that if we define ν ⋆ (s 2 ) = arg min b ′ r(s 2 , b ′ ), then ν ⋆ is optimal at every state s 2 and thus also attains the minimum outside. Defining f k (s 2 ) = r(s 2 , ν k (s 2 )) − r(s 2 , ν ⋆ (s 2 )), we have that f k (s 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] and is a fixed function of s 2 before playing episode k. Thus, if we define
then ∆ k is a bounded martingale difference sequence adapted to F k−1 , so by the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality we have with probability at least 1 − δ that K k=1 ∆ k ≤ C K log(1/δ) = C T log(1/δ).
On this event, we have
r(s k 2 , ν k (s 2 )) − r(s 2 , ν ⋆ (s 2 )) I +C K log(1/δ).
The first term above is the regret for the contexual bandit problem (with context s 2 ) that the min player faces. Further, the min player in Algorithm 3 plays the mirror descent (EXP3) algorithm independently for each context s 2 . Therefore, by standard regret bounds for mirror descent (e.g. Theorem 11.1, (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2018)) we have (choosing η − ≡ log B/T in the fixed s 2 case, and using the EXP3++ scheduling (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014) ) for the contextual case), we have
which combined with the above bound gives that with high probability
where ι = log(SABT /δ).
D Subroutine REWARD FREE EXPLORATION
In this section, we present the REWARD FREE EXPLORATION algorithm, as well as the proofs for Lemma 13. The algorithm and results presented in this section is simple adaptation of the algorithm in Jin et al. (2020) , which studies reward-free exploration in the single-agent MDP setting.
Since the guarantee of Lemma 13 only involves the evaluation of the value under fixed policies, it does not matter whether players try to maximize the reward or minimize the reward. Therefore, to prove Lemma 13 in this section, with out loss of generality, we will treat this Markov game as a single player MDP, where the agent take control of both players' actions in MG. For simplicity, prove for the case S 1 = S 2 = · · · = S H , A 1 = A 2 = · · · = A H = A. It is straightforward to extend the proofs in this section to the setting where those sets are not equal.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 4, which consists of three loops. The first loop computes a set of policies Ψ. By uniformly sampling policy within set Ψ, one is guaranteed visit all "significant" states with reasonable probabilities. The second loop simply collecting data from such sampling procedure for N episodes. The third loop computes empirical transition and empirical reward by averaging the observation data collected in the second loop. We note Algorithm 4 use subroutine EULER, which is the algorithm presented in Zanette and Brunskill (2019) .
We can prove the following lemma, where Lemma 13 is a direct consequence of Lemma 14.
This directly gives a self-play algorithm with following regret guarantee A, B , T ) + f (S, B, A, T )
However, we note there are two notable cases, despite they are also results with guarantees against adversarial opponent, their regret are not in the form (14), thus can not be used to give self-play algorithm, and obtain regret bound in our setting.
The first case is R-MAX algorithm (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2002) , which studies Markov games, with guarantees in the following form.
where {µ k } K k=1 are strategies played by the max-player, {ν k } K k=1 are the adversarial strategies played by the opponent, (µ ⋆ , ν ⋆ ) are the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game, g is a bound depends on S, A, B, T . We note this guarantee is weaker than (14), and thus can not be used to obtain regret bound in the setting of this paper.
The second case is algorithms designed for adversarial MDP (see e.g. Zimin and Neu, 2013; Rosenberg and Mansour, 2019; Jin et al., 2019) , whose adversarial opponent can pick adversarial reward function. We note in Markov games, the action of the opponent not only affects the reward received but also affects the transition to the next state. Therefore, these results for adversaril MDP with adversarial rewards do not directly apply to the setting of Markov game.
